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The analysis of non-take-up: beyond the service relation model 
Philippe Warin 
 
Abstract 
Service relations are not systematically fluid, and resistance is sometimes encountered in cases of non-take-up. 
The service relation model fails to take this into account. Therefore, as service agents’ work consists in dealing 
with users’ relations not only with themselves, but also with the offer, the analysis of non-take-up of rights and 
services requires a specific analytical model. This model would need to take users into account along with their 
relations to the offer and the normative content of that offer, over and above its delivery. In this respect, the 
social relation to the service model is more appropriate. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The service relation model enables us to analyse interactions between service providers and users. One would 
expect that it might afford an understanding of why the service is sometimes not delivered, yet that is not the 
case. The reason lies in the very construction of the model. Non-take-up – that is, the fact that a person does not 
receive all or part of a monetary or other benefit to which they are entitled – therefore requires a specific 
analytical model. The “social relation to service” concept seems best suited to modelling non-take-up – at least 
partially –, since it provides a framework for analysing  beneficiaries’ relation to public policies, particularly to 
social policies. 
 
Short presentation of the service relation model 
 
The service relation concept was theorized by Erving Goffman in the 1960s, in his study on interactions in a 
hospital (Goffman 1961). In the 1950s, Everett Hughes, also a sociology professor at the University of Chicago, 
had introduced it to highlight the sociological interest of service occupations. Based on Hughes’ precursory 
research, Goffman conceptualized service relations as a process of transformation: a service relation aims for the 
production of a change, by a service provider (A), at the request of and often in relationship with a user (B), in a 
reality (C) concerning that user. Goffman’s innovation consisted in the introduction of “a relational dimension in 
the very course of service delivery, there where the production of goods could be seen without taking that 
dimension into account” (Ughetto 2013). The service relation was subsequently modelled by economists, 
including Jean Gadrey, among others. They followed in the footsteps of Peter Hill (Hill 1977) who presented it as 
a triangular relation between the service provider, the user, and the needs that brought them together (Gadrey 
2000). This frameworkof analysis indicates that the service provider has to take two dimensions into account: the 
user’s needs, and the user’s relation to those needs. For the provider, the service relation is therefore both a 
“technical relation,” one of defining needs and mobilizing resources, and a “personal relation” in which the user is 
involved in the production of a response to those needs.  
 
The following graph applies this model to the work of professionals delivering home care to dependent elderly 
persons (Gucher et al. 2011). It shows that this type of relation is not simply one of service delivery (measurable 
in hours of service delivered) aimed at meeting the elderly person’s daily needs (A on C); it is also a social 
relationship between the agent and the elderly person (A with B and often their family), to act on their 
representations and ways of acting in order to activate their capacities for autonomy (B on C).  
 
 
Graphics 1: Service relation model applied to home care for dependant elderly persons 
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The fact that research on public services took into account the notion of service relations and the analytical model 
stemming from it served as a basis for explaining the technical and relational nature of interactions between 
service providers and users. This in turn was valuable for improving the quality of the services delivered. This 
research field was developed in France in the 1990s under a large research programme on “Service Relations in 
the Public Sector,” supported by several government organizations, ministries and public-sector businesses. The 
aim was to study situations of interaction between service providers and users, in order to analyse the 
competences and power deployed in the actual delivery of services to the public. The ultimate goal then was to 
improve the effectiveness of procedures and the use of resources, in order to support the modernization of 
administrative functioning by making it more efficient and less costly. Because the offer put to users in the form 
of actual individualized output was not always suited to systematically meeting their needs, the study of service 
relations provided both a framework of analysis and the sociological methods for this praxeology. Inspired by 
English-language studies on street-level bureaucracy (SLB) – used in public policy and even in social policy 
analysis (Lipsky 1991) of administrations’ role in the actual delivery of public goods –, this sociology questioned 
above all the dysfunctions of the managerial apparatus and the reparatory role of agents. It also examined the 
rationalization of service relations through the formatting of administrative languages and the standardization of 
communication procedures. This was explicitly at the service of administrative reform. Researchers produced a 
general presentation of “front-office activities” that showed how public-sector structures could be modernized 
through agents’ daily practices (Weller 1998). They thereby contributed to some extent to the renewal of the 
sociology of work (Joseph et al. 1995). 
 
This renewal seems to be peculiar to France, as British and American sociologists analysed work in services 
without looking at service relations per se (Ughetto 2013). The service relation model was imported into France in 
the 1990s by the  sociologist Isaac Joseph, through Erving Goffman’s work. Some of the researchers participating 
in the research mentioned above found this strange, insofar as the work of reparation described by Goffman and 
the exercise of discretionary power  highlighted by Michael Lipsky (1980) were combined in the same 
presentation – to the extent that it was easy to confuse them. Although these two sociologies had neither the 
same disciplinary origins nor the same scientific subjects – micro-sociological analysis of interactions on the one 
hand and socio-political analysis of administrative work on the other – the scientific advantages of reconciling 
them was apparent, even including certain criticism levelled at Lipsky’s work. In particular, in his analysis of 
professional discretion in social work, Tony Evans considered that Lipsky’s theory took only organizational identity 
into account, and disregarded professionalism. Yet different professionals have different approaches to users, 
based on their training, profession and activity, as well as their age, gender or ethnicity, and not only on their 
position in the organization (Evans 2010). Evans defended an idea that was subsequently adopted by many, 
when he said that the “degree of discretion,” which varied between different welfare areas, countries and social 
work professions, was subject to changes, and evolved over time. The reparation work of the caseworkers 
directly in contact with the public would thus be resituated in its institutional and professional context. 
 
Broadening the question of users’ take-up of the public offer 
 
Following public policy changes induced by the gradual inclusion of actors other than public administrations, 
notably associative actors but also private businesses, the focus of research extended beyond SLB, to street-level 
organizations (SLO). The broadening of the research subject was intended to examine the impact of forms of 
governance and intervention induced by these mixed public-private arrangements on services delivered to the 
public. This work, undertaken more recently, notably at the University of Chicago’s School of Social Service 
Administration, studies the actual effects of contractualization on organizations and professional practices 
(Brodkin 2011). 
 
When the implementation of public policies is investigated from this angle, the tensions generated by the 
rationalization of objectives and the means induced by these institutional arrangements lie at the heart of the on-
going analysis of service relations throughout the world. In French studies, these realities are examined in the 
social sector, in particular. This sector provides personal aid to individuals. It is attracting a growing number of 
employer organizations that operate according to a market economy model. The demand for rationalization – 
weighing on social and medico-social work in particular (delivered at home or out-of-home) – has been analysed 
as a consequence of a general process of “marketization” that both modifies the organization of the field and its 
mode of financing, and seeks to overturn the meaning that the actors in the field give to their work (Chauvière 
2009). By taking into account a diversity of sectors, some authors stress the responsibility left to service 
providers, who are expected to submit to expectations and increasingly to users’ behaviours. Hence, the 
“discretionary power” of agents in most direct contact with the public, which Michael Lipsky highlighted in his 
work on SLB (Lipsky 1980), seems inevitable (Maynard-Moody et al. 2000) and may be reinforced (Gilson 2015). 
Street-level bureaucrats have limited resources (time, money, etc.) and cannot enforce all the rules. They 
therefore need discretion. In many circumstances, discretion makes it possible to adapt the policy to users’ 
individual needs, which increases the meaningfulness of the policy for them, and therefore the value of social 
benefits as public services (Meyers et al. 2003). That is why discretionary power is essential, as much for street-
level bureaucrats as for caseworkers. Discretion can furthermore positively affect professionals’ willingness to 
implement outputs and thus policy (Tummers et al. 2012). 
 
These studies have shown that service providers stand to gain from users’ adhesion, if the public service offer is 
to be  implemented and justified. Hence, the model used to analyse the service relationship has to take into 
account the fact that service delivery agents have to obtain users’ adhesion if the public offer is to be delivered – 
and to be delivered it has to have been accepted.  
 
The notion of discretion has been discussed between defenders of both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective 
on policy implementation. From a top-down perspective (Sabatier et al. 1979, Pressman et al. 1984, Hogwood et 
al. 1984), policy implementation is seen solely as a mechanistic process that is completely isolated from policy 
making, without feedback. In this approach, discretion is not welcomed and must be controlled (Polsky 1993, 
Brehm et al. 1999). Conversely, from a bottom-up perspective on discretion (Lipsky 1980, Barret et al. 1981, Hanf 
1982, Hjern et al. 1982, Elmore 1985), street-level bureaucrats’ action appears to be no longer simply a matter of 
reparation/adaptation with a view to delivering a service. Instead, it is a matter of assessment – usually without 
adequate pre-established criteria – of users’ behaviours, where this behaviour, and no longer only users’ 
conditions and/or status, determines their eligibility for financial or non-financial benefits. That is why the 
interpretation and implementation of constraints is left up to the front-line agents, for this work is at the heart of 
the “individualized governance of behaviours” (Dubois 2010). More broadly, the importance of this work is 
apparent in a diversity of studies on social protection (Keiser 2010, Rowe 2002), health insurance systems  
(Hägglund 2012), child welfare (Duffy et al. 2010), care (Evans 2010, Petchey et al. 2008), and e-Administration 
(Marston 2006). But the sociology of social or medico-social intervention goes further. It considers that the 
discretionary power of caseworkers is the keystone of highly complex professional practices. This is because they 
have to take into account simultaneously the logics of social politics, the conditions in which users and their 
needs are taken into account, family cultures, and the resulting conceptions of intimacy (Dajoui 2014). 
 
Non-take-up: a phenomenon often overlooked 
 
The sociology of service relations has tended to study users only in terms of “what agents do.” Users have 
therefore remained a sort of “foil.” In public policy analysis we rarely find an open approach (Warin 1999) to 
service relations as the regulation of interests, that is, an approach that implements broader representation, in 
which users project their expectations of the administration, policies and even politics. The sociology of service 
relations does not take this political dimension into account, in that it does not consider the fact that the 
relationship between service provider and user consists not only in involving the latter in the production of a 
response to their own needs, but also in creating consent in the rules of the social game instituted by public 
policies. This is a micro-sociology, as Urghetto says, the main concern of which is to create a detailed corpus of 
interactions in order to ascertain how the actors in the relationship construct a situated result. It therefore does 
not aim to identify and to study the significations of interactions in terms of social relations, that is, confrontation 
with an issue of social signification of the public offer, from which the protagonists (notably the users) affirm their 
individuality (particularly as actors and citizens). In the sociological debate there is a core difference between “the 
relation” and “the relationship,” and therefore between their respective studies. “The relation” concerns pre-
existing elements between which a link is established, whereas the concept of “relationship” implies that “it is in 
the relationship that the protagonists are created and produced.” In a relationship, …  
… it is not about a role, a functioning defined in a hypothetically integrated global society. One does not take part 
in a social relationship in the same way as one takes on a social role or function [as in a relation]. One 
participates as a protagonist, that is, as someone who is going to contribute to the very existence and 
development of the relationship. (Zarifian 2013) 
 
In the sociology of service relations, individuals who “actively and voluntarily” practice non-take-up, in other 
words, who deliberately do not take advantage of their rights for the above reasons, are largely overlooked. This 
non-take-up, which I call “intentional,” stems from a conflict over the meaning of the public offer, due to 
disagreement with its norms (Warin 2016). To understand what is at stake, we can distinguish between “use 
value” and “exchange value” as did Marx and, before him, Adam Smith and Ricardo, and already established by 
Aristotle. In the case of intentional non-take-up, assessment of benefits or services goes beyond the value related 
to the assumed or actual advantages of their use. It primarily concerns their exchange value, the standard of 
which is not money but a type of social relationship established as a general norm, or perceived as such. This 
nontake-up, which stems from a conception of the significance of the public offer, therefore involves a social 
relationship and not only a relationship with the service provider. Likewise, but from the perspective of “moral 
economies,” other authors talk of “reasoned” non-take-up (Tabin et al. 2016).  
 
The very existence of this social relationship is usually not seen. In the French conception of the administrative 
system, citizens are supposed to be satisfied with the services and social benefits that are offered to them, and 
the agents providing those services are supposed to systematically deliver them. Because of this path 
dependency, many public policy actors fail to see non-take-up as intentional. They argue that this is necessarily 
something that users are victims of, relating largely to themselves, or else see it simply as a problem relating to 
information or the processing of applications. 
 
There are numerous reasons for this short-sightedness. As regards caseworkers, it is important to note that the 
growing individualization of social policies precludes all reference to a differentiated approach to users, due to the 
multiple criteria and procedures. This leads to differentiation according to administrative norms, but does not take 
into account the possibility of simply “not wanting” as a criterion of differentiation of potential users. The 
caseworkers delivering the service are not able to see that non-take-up also raises the question of the relevance 
of the public offer. In a sense they maintain a culture of bureaucratic domination based on the negation of any 
differentiation of individuals/public concerning their expectations with regard to the public offer.  
 
Studies on non-take-up show why potential beneficiaries may refuse the public offer and how this refusal 
(reflected in non-take-up, non-demand or exit) has political meaning, when it is explained in terms of  
disagreement with the principles, norms and values underpinning the content of the offer and its conditions of 
implementation. Whereas the sociology of service relations, which bases its analysis on SLB or SLO, fails to see 
this political dimension, work on non-take-up, and particularly on intentional non-take-up, is of great interest. The 
latter research shows why and how the refusal of the public offer sometimes stems not from a (single) calculation 
of interests, but from disagreement on the meaning given to the central objectives of the public offer or/and 
elements of its implementation (rules, procedures, practices). 
 
Without going into a general explanation of the political dimension of the non-take-up phenomenon presented 
elsewhere  (Warin 2016), my intention here is to show why the study of non-take-up cannot be contained in the 
service relation model. Consider the empirical case introduced above. 
 
The oversight of the service relation model 
 
The research on which I draw here primarily concerned take-up of home care services by the elderly (and their 
families). Home care is a professional practice characterized by tension, because it requires a caseworker to 
reconcile all of the following: unavoidable intrusiveness with respect for intimacy; a professional approach with a 
code of hospitality; normalizing control with support for individuals; and being homebound while maintaining a 
social link. It is a category of social and medico-social action that enables a firm grasp of the place of the service 
relationship in social work. Elian Djaoui highlights the paradoxical objectives for which practitioners have to strive: 
both support for highly vulnerable populations, and control of “deviant” behaviours; thus, maintaining the social 
link but also the risk of “social withdrawal” at home (Djaoui 2014). 
 
By looking at an SLO type of service that was largely informed by the service relation paradigm, well before it had 
spread to France, I show that this model as it stands does not include all the dimensions of taking up the offer. I 
have found the following to be true. First, it appears that take-up concerns two related dimensions: services 
delivered, and elderly people’s relationship to themselves. In this respect, the service relation model is clearly 
useful. Yet the take-up of home services is not based on the same expectations, if the aged individual is still 
autonomous or, on the contrary, dependent on outside help, whether professional or by the family. Many 
interviews bear witness to a wish to “control the vagaries of biology” which Dominique Memmi talks of (Memmi 
2000), since elderly people carry on seeing themselves on a life path (even if theirs is the repetitive daily pattern 
of a life’s end). This is their only way of expressing the wishes or demands through which they can continue to 
have some control over things or themselves – or at least to have an impression of having some control. 
Depending on whether the elderly person is autonomous or not, the wishes or demands on which their take-up of 
home care services are based are not the same. From what they say, it seems that behind their wishes and 
demands, the least autonomous elderly people need to be reassured about their aging, whereas the most 
autonomous ones need to be respected as they are. The former take up home care services if these services 
guarantee them physical integrity and recognize their social role. The latter take up home care services if they 
respect their disabilities. 
 
In both cases, elderly people hope that they will not be disqualified. They wish either to be recognized as 
individuals who are unable to do the work delegated to the care worker, only because of their own loss of 
autonomy, or else to be respected despite their advanced state of dependence. The avoidance of this 
disqualification is both the crux of the service relation and the core of the care worker’s know-how. It is also the 
criterion on the basis of which elderly people take up home care services or not (that is, help defined in terms of 
actions and time). They assess home care services through widely varied scales of value, even if their evaluation 
of the offer generally revolves around a few main normative expectations: the body, social interaction, respect. 
Elderly people may therefore not take up the full number of hours for which they are eligible, if they consider that 
the content of the services does not suit them – aside from potential inconveniences related to their actual 
realization (notably the turnover of care workers). In other words, the service may conflict with their perceptions 
of their own needs and with their representations of the treatment of old-age and of dependence as it is 
perceived through the services proposed. In this case, the failure to use all the services proposed can be 
explained by conflicting representations and norms regarding what it means to help individuals to be 
autonomous. Non-take-up stems explicitly from this issue of signification. As an act of signification it is – with 
reference to Roland Barthes – a profoundly social act. 
 
Of course, other factors explain non-take-up of all the hours of home-care services to which beneficiaries are 
entitled. Every individual has their own story and habits. Differences of age matter, between the helper and the 
helped, along with gender and culture. As regards services delivered at the client’s home, the notion of autonomy 
appears as relative. It does indeed depend on the individual’s physical and psychological state, but it also varies 
according to their life’s course, their  personality, their culture, and so on. Controlling all of these depends on the 
caseworkers’ professional skills, and will therefore vary from one to another. 
 
That being so, this example shows that the act of service delivery is by no means systematic, nor something that 
stands to reason. Its realization sometimes encounters users’ resistance. That is why interactions between service 
providers and users necessarily lead to the regulation of norms and principles (Warin 2002). The service relation 
model should therefore be formulated differently, if we are to take into account the resistance that produces non-
take-up. In particular, the work of the service delivery agents (the home care workers and the medico-social 
team) consists in acting on users’ relations not only to themselves and their needs, but also to the offer:  
 
 
Graphics 2: Social relation to service model applied to home care for dependant elderly persons 
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A general finding emerges from this example. When we take into account the fact that the service is not 
necessarily delivered, the initial service relation model no longer works, simply because it cannot integrate such a 
hypothesis into the technical and relational relationships comprising it. In particular, intentional non-take-up leads 
us to consider that the question is neither only nor even primarily that of the users’ relation to their own needs, 
but rather one of their relation to the offer. The case used as an example – and many others that would yield 
similar results, such as the minimum income support allowance (RSA), food allowances, and holiday allowances 
(Warin 2018) – indicates above all that users’ relations to their needs are linked to their representation of the 
offer.  
 
The relation to the offer is usually considered to depend on the individual’s needs. This indicates that the 
consumer paradigm still carries a lot of weight. However, the analysis of non-take-up enables us to see things 
differently. Although users have needs, they may refuse the offer because of their assessment thereof. This 
assessment may concern the satisfaction which the potential beneficiary thinks they may derive from use of the 
offer to meet their needs (its “use value”); or it may also concern the general “global sense” that he or she 
attributes to the offer in terms of social progress, protection, solidarity, assistance, etc. (its “exchange value”). 
Yet the advantages of the offer in terms of use value (utility) are not always enough if its exchange value (social 
significance) does not seem acceptable.  
 
This process of assessment of the offer is at the heart of “the reception of policies by their public,” to which 
research on non-take-up is contributing to introduce as central to public policy analysis (Warin 2016). This 
research subject renews the study of the implementation of policies from the angle of the offer’s relevance to its 
recipients. It also opens the interesting possibility of policy feedback analysis, if our objective is to verify the 
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existence of relations between constrained/voluntary non-take-up, the formation of political judgements, and 
political behaviours. 
 
An uncomfortable postulate 
 
The service relation model is not designed to describe the case of intentional non-take-up and certainly does not 
explain how agents can remedy these situations. The model is limited to the agent’s intervention to meet the 
user’s need, and to the user’s relation to his or her own need. It excludes the user’s perception of the content of 
the offer, over and above the act of the service delivery (the user is simply the “foil”). To incorporate this type of 
situation, which is by no means the only one (non-take-up in general is a massive phenomenon and intentional 
non-take-up is not residual), the model would need to introduce what it presently excludes: the social 
significations of the public offer to users; even if the sociology of service relations aims to show how service 
providers are able to support interactions through relationship (politeness), techniques, and contractual means 
(rights and duties pre-established for each party) (Joseph 1998). 
 
The public offer is not taken into account in the service relation model, because this model is based on the 
postulate that the offer is necessarily delivered. The only question then is how that will be done, and how the 
production process can be improved (a sociology in the service of reform). The problem is that this is far from 
always being the case. The service is not systematically rendered, for many reasons related first and foremost to 
the conditions of the offer itself. 
 
Michael Lipsky clearly perceived this situation, even though he did not directly focus on the sociological model of 
service relations. His whole analysis of street level bureaucrats consisted in studying the ways in which agents 
went about their work with the public when faced with various constraints. His research fields were essentially 
large North-American cities such as New York, which were facing financial collapse if not bankruptcy in the 1970s. 
As Mike Rowe so clearly shows, Lipsky’s analysis is of work carried out under conditions of “rationing of 
resources” to distribute and of the means to do so (Rowe 2012). Rather than modeling or theorizing the service 
relationship, Lipsky observed and commented on service providers’ action in situations of tight budgetary 
constraints. His pioneering analysis was on the way of delivering regulated benefits to satisfy users’ demands, 
while taking into account not only financial constraints (resources), but also legal (objectives and public policy 
regulations) and managerial ones (performance of organized systems). It shows that agents’ discretionary power 
stems from a constant orchestration of rules, constraints and demands. This is what gives their activity a political 
dimension (Gilson 2015). 
 
Following Lipsky, other authors have validated the need for discretion, also from a bottom-up perspective. They 
stress the importance of management of professional teams. In his book published in 2010, Tony Evans 
introduced the question with an empirical case study, among others, of a social service team working at the 
homes of the elderly. This in-depth analysis shows how discretion can work, and in particular the position of 
managers, not only as bureaucrats in a top-down process, but also as professionals who at least partly share 
value with the caseworkers. In France, the basic training of caseworkers being what it is, employers and team 
managers have to help them, through advice, additional training, support, and sharing practices. But this support 
is situated less in a context creating frameworks for practice than it is in Australia, the UK, the USA, and Canada, 
for instance, due particularly to the vertical structure of social policies, fields of intervention, and professions. In 
France, managerial expectations are very strong, irrespective of the field of intervention (assistance for the 
dependent elderly, for small children, for disabled persons, etc.). Teams of professionals are subjected to 
obligations to provide results, imposed by funding bodies (local authorities, social institutions, insurance 
companies, investment funds), and to an increasingly stringent normative framework of practices. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The short-sightedness of the service relation model with regard to non take-up is symptomatic of the difficulty of 
considering, at least, that users (even fragile and dependent ones) can decide, on their own, to use or not to use 
the available offer, depending on its use value (utility) and its exchange value (the type of social relation imposed 
on users). Hence, the sociology of service relations does not perceive the political dimension of intentional non-
take-up through signified disagreement with the principles and norms of the public offer. My intention is not to 
criticize this sociology and certainly not to initiate a controversy. I simply wish to point out that we can perceive 
its difficulty in conceiving of the possibility of intentional non-take-up, even though the other forms of the 
phenomenon reveal its existence. As resistance to social work which aims to prevent non-take-up shows, the 
oversight is therefore largely shared among researchers and deciders, as well as service providers themselves 
(Warin 2014).  
 
Ultimately, the issue is not that the non-take-up phenomenon jams the service relation model, but that, since this 
model is unable to fully accommodate non-take-up, the phenomenon becomes the object, in its own right, of 
another analytical framework. Above all, we can consider that the non-take-up approach needs a separate 
analytical model, simply because the service relation model shows that defining a professional is impossible 
without involving the user (or client), and that the analysis of non-take-up reveals that there is no user without 
taking into account his or her relation to the offer and to its normative content, over and above the service 
delivery act.  
 
In so far as the analysis of non-take-up shows what the service relation model cannot incorporate, it is necessary 
to examine how both of them, beyond their own objectives and orientations, can be articulated. If, as we 
suggested, the crux of the matter is the problem of framing the joint relations of service providers and users of 
the offer, it would probably be advisable for us to revert to the “social relation to service” concept. As Philippe 
Zarifian, one of its main instigators, explains, this concept is designed to account for the structuring and partially 
structuring part of the social relations of the production of services and their delivery (Zarifian2013). More 
precisely, he indicates that the social relation to service stems both from the encounter between the agents of 
service provision, faced with demands to process, and with the financial, legal and managerial constraints of the 
offer (what Lipsky pointed out); as well as the users’ encounter with the normative content of the offer (what the 
analysis of non-take-up shows). Based on this, it can be seen as the general encounter with an issue (which may 
partly be common to the providers and recipients) of social signification of the public offer, i. e. of its constraints 
and of its normative content. The social relation to service concept seems to be fully meaningful for modelling 
non-take-up as a framework of analysis, since it is based on the understanding that the public has its word to say 
on the relevance of the public offer, in terms of exchange value, social needs, (moral) concepts of “fairness for 
all” and ethical concepts of “good for oneself” (Warin 2016). 
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